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I N T H E UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Priority 10

CURTIS W. COLLINS,

Court of Appeals #: 20010371-CA

Defendant/ Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

I. ARGUMENT
The Defendant submits this reply brief in response to three (3) contentions asserted in
the Appellee's Brief.
First, that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was properly before the court
to be considered by the lower court in determining the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Second, that the Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his claim that "Utah Code
Annotated 62A-12-232(1) (a) (i) was not complied with when the Defendant was committed into
the custody of the mental health authority" [Bi.Aplt. 15]; and therefore appellant review of its
merits is precluded.
Third, that the Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his claim that "the lower court's
Memorandum Decision advanced new theories of which the Defendant neither had notice nor
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an opportunity to address, therefore, the Defendant's due process rights were denied." [Br.Aplt.
14] and therefore appellant review of its merits is precluded.
1.

Preliminary Hearing Evidence. The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing of this
case was not properly before the court to be considered when determining the Motion
to Suppress. The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing is not part of the record
to be considered on this appeal.
The Appellee's assertions that,
"Because the trial judge conducted the preliminary hearing and was
familiar with the facts, the trial judge and counsel agreed that an
evidentiary hearing was not necessary to resohe the motion to suppress
(R. 27-28; R. 69: 32-34). It was decided that 'if there's going to be an issue
on the testimony, it would be a lot easier if [counsel] just get the videotape
and either of you make a transcript of that little portion. (R.69: 33)'"
[Aple.Brf. 3]
The portion of the preliminary hearing transcript cited in support of the Appellee's
assertion is attached hereto as Addendum 1. The transcript verifies that the Appellee's
assertion is unfounded. The Defendant clearly did not agree that the preliminary hearing
evidence could be considered by the judge at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress. If
there was any agreement between the judge and counsel it certainly required that a
transcript of the preliminary hearing be available at the motion hearing. The transcript
of the preliminary hearing was not prepared and filed until after this appeal was filed on
April 24,2001. The preliminary hearing transcript was certified by the court reporter on
July 11, 2001 and filed in the court on July 17, 2001.
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The only facts that were before the court to be considered were the facts stated
in the Defendant's Memorandum and the two (2) police reports attached thereto. [R. 40,
41, 44-46, 55, 70 p.2,1. 20-22] The State reaffirmed the relevant facts before the lower
court in its Response to the Defendant's Suppression Motion, "the State accepts the facts
as stated in the defendant's brief." [R. 55] The facts as presented by the Defendant were
undisputed and consequendy the preliminary hearing transcript was not requested at that
time.
Although there is no indication that the lower court judge relied to any extent on
the preliminary hearing evidence, the Appellee's Brief heavily relies upon the preliminary
hearing transcript in its statement of facts and consequendy misstates many of the facts
and incorrecdy claims that many of the facts were before the lower court to be
considered at the motion hearing when they were not. One particularly egregious and
misleading example is the factual assertion at the bottom of page 5 of the Appellee's
Brief "When the defendant arrived at the hospital, the hospital staff requested Yeates to
assist them in undressing defendant (R.69: 14-15)." This was not presented in the
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress or either of the police
reports attached thereto and was not before the lower court to be considered in
determining the Motion to Suppress.
2.

Failure to Preserve Issues for Appeal.

The Defendant's claim that "Utah Code

Annotated 62A-12-232(l)(a)(i) was not complied with when the Defendant was
committed into the custody of the local mental health authority" and that "the lower

91070.05\BnefReply.wpd
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court's Memorandum Decision advanced new theories of which the Defendant neither
had notice nor an opportunity to address therefore the Defendant's due process rights
were denied" are properly before the Court for appellate review. Both issues are
essentially the same and will be addressed together in this brief.
At the time the lower court announced that it intended to take the motion under
advisement and to do some independent research, the Defendant had no notice that the
lower court would go beyond the arguments made by the prosecution and the Defendant
at the hearing. The Defendant had no notice that the lower court would imply a warrant
exception under the mental health statute to support its decision. The Defendant did not
have notice that the lower court would base its decision on the emergency circumstances
exception. The emergency circumstances exception was not discussed or argued by the
prosecution. The Defendant was not in a position to object to the lower count's desire
to take the motion under advisement and do independent research. The ruling was made
without giving the Defendant the opportunity to respond. The Defendant's counsel did
give the lower court notice during the motion hearing that he desired to respond to any
authorities that went beyond what the prosecution had already presented. Counsel stated
to the lower court,
"If in fact it's not justified incident to an arrest, we need to identify, if
we're going to allow it in, a specific exception, one of those well
delineated exceptions. I challenge anybody to show me any case law th_at
shows me any of those well delineated exceptions here. It just doesn't fit
any of them that I know.
Now, I apologi2e to say I challenge. Maybe you'll think of one riglit
quickly. If you do, fine. I would really like to have a chance to respond
to it, but I don't see any. Thank you." [R. 70: p. 8,1. 12-21, Addendum 2]
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In the event that the issues, or either of them, were not properly preserved for
appeal their merits should be considered on appeal either based on the "exceptional
circumstances" exception and/or the "plain error" exception. State vs. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, 10 P.3d 346; Monson vs. Carver, 1999 UT, 928 P.2d 1017; State vs. Eldredge, 1989
UT, 773 P.2d 29; State vs. Verde, 1989 UT, 770 P.2d 116.
The fact that the lower court rejected all of the prosecution's arguments advanced
at the motion hearing and then did its own independent research and based its decisions
on two theories not presented at the motion hearing is certainly an "exceptional
circumstance". At the very minimum the lower court, prior to issuing its decision,
should have informed the Defendant of the ruling and allowed the Defendant to submit
a reply. This was a procedural irregularity that adversely impacted the Defendant's due
process rights.
In regard to plain error, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in State vs. Holgate that,
"The plain error exception enables the appellate court to 'balance the need
for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.' State vs. Verde
supra. cAt bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit us to avoid
injustice.' State vs. Eldredge supra. To demonstrate plain error, a defendant
must establish that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined." Id. at ^13
The lower court committed "plain error" when it found that the "Certificate for
Commitment to Local Mental Health Authority" met the requirements of the Mental
Health Act and authorized the Defendant to be committed to the local me ntal health
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authority. \K. 43] After reviewing Utah Code Annotated 62-12-232, it should have been
obvious to the lower court that the statute was only partially complied with. The plain
error is harmful to the Defendant because the lower court used compliance with the
statute to deny the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood the lower court would have found in favor of the Defendant. The
Appellant's Brief sets out the requirements and the procedures of the statute. [Aplt.Brf.
Addendum 3] The Defendant was not properly committed into the custody of the local
mental health authority.

II.

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in the Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Suppress is undisputed and was properly before the lower court. The preliminary hearing
evidence was not considered by the lower court. The evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing is not part of the record to be considered on appeal.
The Defendant's claims of non-compliance with Utah Code Annotated 62A-12232(1) (a) (i), Temporary Committment and violation of his due process rights were preserved for
appeal and are properly before the Court to be considered for appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of April, 2002.

102 South 100 West
P. O. Box 461
Brigham City, UT 84302
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to:
Christine F. Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 894114-0854
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2002.
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ADDENDUM 1

1
2

THE COURT:

Does he waive having that read here in

open court?

3

We ? ll waive the reading and he intends

MR. MOLGARD:

4

to enter a not guilty plea.

5

THE COURT:

All right.

6

schedule a pretrial conference?

7

motions?

8

MR, MOLGARD:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

Counsel, do we need to
Do you anticipate any

I anticipate motions.
All right.

How much time do you need to

have your motions filed?
Ifd really like up to about 30 days to

MR. MOLGARD:

12

put together a motion on this one and the other felony case.

13

I think they're kind of complicated motions.

14

one is a kind of complicated motion to figure out.

15

anticipate it will take about 30 days.

16

MR. BUNDERSON:

17

THE COURT:

I think this
I

I don f t have any objection to that.

All right.

Today's the 17th.

I f ll give

18

you until Friday, February 16th, by five p.m. to file your

19

motion and memoranda.

20

does the state want for a response?

And then how much time, Mr. Bunderson,

21

MR. BUNDERSON:

22

THE COURT:

Maybe a couple of weeks after that.

All right.

Friday, March 2nd, state's

23

reply will be due.

Then let's look at our calendar.

24

have time March 12th for a hearing?

25

March 12th, for a hearing on the motion.

Okay.

Do we

Three o'clock,

Are we going to

1

need testimony at that hearing?

2

MR. BUNDERSON:

3

I wonder if we f ll really need an

evidentiary hearing?

4

MR. MOLGARD:

5

MR. BUNDERSON:

We may or may not.
Obviously there's an issue of

6

exactly how the item was retrieved, but there isn't any

7

dispute from where it was retrieved.

8

involve more --

9

MR. MOLGARD:

Well, there's a custody --

10

MR. BUNDERSON:

11

which seems to be a legal issue.

12

THE COURT:

I think the issue may

The custody status of the defendant,

That's what I'm thinking.

But if

13

there's going to be an issue on the testimony, it would be a

14

lot easier if you just get the videotape and either of you

15

make a transcript of that little portion.

16

MR. MOLGARD:

That's what I was thinking.

17

the videotape of this, probably.

18

again?

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BUNDERSON:

21
22

Certainly

March 12th, what time

Three o'clock.

Does that work?

It works for us.

That's an

evidentiary hearing?
MR. MOLGARD:

It seems to me that I was in the

23

juvenile court this morning and the juvenile court set a

24

hearing -- no, that was just discussed.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

Yes, that will work.

Well, we'll reserve enough time

1

that that could be an evidentiary hearing, but Ifm kind of

2

hoping you won't need to.

3

MR. MOLGARD:

I agree with you.

4

MR. BUNDERSON:

I agree in the sense I'm not sure

5

any of the facts are necessarily relevant so much as the

6

custodial status and what we can do based on that.

7
8
9
10
11
12

THE COURT:

Any other issues to address this

afternoon?
MR. BUNDERSON:

No.

Well, Mr. Collins is to

continue with the conditions of release?
THE COURT:

The same conditions.

And the other

three accompanying cases are continued to that date as well

13

MR. BUNDERSON:

14

THE COURT:

As long we track together.

We'll notify Mr. Merrell, but I won't

15

expect him to appear until such time as we actually address

16

the other cases.

17
18

MR. BUNDERSON:

call me and I could report to him if you would like.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MOLGARD:

21
22
23
24
25

In the notice you could suggest he

Why don't we do t h a t .
T h a n k you, Y o u r

Honor.

(Concluded

at 4.-45

p.m.)
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

1

JUL I J

2
3

BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE

OF

STATE OF UTAH

UTAH,

4
5

,-r tVi n i i

v.» JO

Plaintiff,
Case No. 00100553
Transcript of Videotape

VS

CURTIS COLLINS,
Defendant
8
9
10
11

Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing.
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding.
First District Court Courthouse
Brigham City, Utah
March

26, 2001

- 2:55

p.m.

12
13
14

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

ROGER

F.

BARON

Deputy County Attorney
15
16

For the Defendant:

JACK H.

MOLGARD

Attorney at Law
17
18
19
20
21
22

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
P. 0. Box 873
Brigham City, UT 84302-0873

23

OCT 0 «i 2001

24
25

ORIGINAL

COURT OF APPEALS

1

THE CLERK:

Case number 0011-553.

2

THE COURT:

I think this is 637, isn't it?

3

MR. MOLGARD:

4 J

MR. BARON:

5

I believe that

—

Our response had the wrong number, Your

Honor.

6

MR. MOLGARD:

7

THE COURT:

I think it's 553.

Yes, we have the right case.

I was

8

looking at Mr. Bunderson's response and it does have an

9

incorrect number on it.

10

THE CLERK:

State of Utah versus Curtis W. Collins.

11

THE COURT:

This is the time scheduled for a hearing

12

on the defendant's motion to suppress.

The court's reviewed

13

the motion, the memorandum in support and the state's

14 J response, which was filed just this morning.
15
16

I'll hear from

you at this time, counsel.
MR. MOLGARD:

Yes, Your Honor.

As I indicated in my

17 I memoranda, it's the state's burden to prove an exception to
18

the warrant requirement and the requirement to in effect have

19

the court supervise searches.

20
21

The state's indicated that it agrees with the facts that
I've set out in my memoranda, including the two police

22 I reports that were attached to the memoranda.

I think it's

23 J fairly obvious that what happened here was not an arrest.

I

24

would like to point out the statute under which the state

—

25

under which the law enforcement authorities do the transport

1

in a mental health case.

2

reason I didn't argue the arrest business in my memoranda is

3

because it never occurred to me that anybody might call this

4

an arrest.

5

arrest.

6

That statute is 62 (a)-12-232.

The

I think it stretches credibility to call it an

We don't agree that it was an arrest.

62 (a)-12-232, specifically paren four, says,

7

"Transportation of mentally ill persons, pursuant to sections

8

one and two, shall be conducted by appropriate municipal or

9

city or town law enforcement authority, or under the

10

appropriate law enforcement's authority, by ambulance to the

11

extent that section five applies.

12

facility is outside the authority's jurisdiction, the

13

appropriate county sheriff shall transport the person or

14

cause the person to be transported by ambulance, to the

15

extent that subsection five applies."

16

subsection five applied because they did transport Mr.

17

Collins by ambulance.

18

However, if the designated

Of course, apparently

But the original -- I don't think that contemplates that

19

it's an arrest.

20

problems.

21

law enforcement authority cannot do it unless there's a

22

warrant.

23

that is 77-7, I think.

24
25

I think if it does it creates a flock of

Just as an example, I think if it's an arrest, a

There's no warrant in this case.

THE COURT:

The basis for

I think normally we refer to it as a

civil commitment, wouldn't we?

1

MR. MOLGARD:

2 J commitment.
3

11-1-2,

Yeah, that's what it is, is a civil
an arrest by a peace officer requires

that there be a warrant except for public offenses committed

4 I or attempted in the presence the peace officer, et cetera.
5

I think it f s obvious that if the Brigham City police, or

6

for that matter the county sheriff, arrested this gentleman,

7

that it was without a warrant and there was no public offense

8

committed, period.

9

civil commitment.

It wasn't a public offense, it was a
They had the obligation to transport, I

10 I agree with that.
11

THE COURT:

12

a follow up question.

13

in other capacities.

I follow your argument.

Let me ask you

Sometimes you advise local government
If that's not an arrest, but simply a

14 J civil commitment, but statutorily the sheriff's deputies are
15

required to make that transport, when they deliver this

16

person who by, definition, may be uncooperative.

17

that's the nature of an involuntary commitment is that

18

sometimes they're passive, sometimes they're not at all

19

passive.

20

the facility, such as the state hospital or any hospital,

21

that they basically stand back and say we need a nurse here

22

to look for weapons, we can't do that?

23
24
25

I mean,

Are you suggesting that when they deliver "them to

MR. MOLGARD:

I buy —

yes, I might well say that,

except that that doesn't apply in this case.
THE COURT:

I'm talking about in the bigger picture

in another case.
MR. MOLGARD:

2
3

Even in the bigger picture it normally

wouldn't apply.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. MOLGARD:

Who would look for weapons?
If you'll let me explain.

The Brigham

When they took Mr. Collins

6

City police look fo r the weapons.

7

from the Bear River Mental Health to the Brigham City

8

emergency room initially, they looked for weapons

9

a search.

10

That's part of the facts.

They did

The Brigham City police

did a search.
Did they have authority for that search?

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. MOLGARD:

I think —

I'm not sure th ey did have

13

authority for that search, but that's not what IMTl

14

questioning here.

15

search.

16

the theories of the Terry stop and the Terry cust<Ddy things.

17

Initially they have a right to see that there's no weapons,

18

to see that there's no danger.

19

circumstances that allows that to do it initially

20

happened here.

21

that.

22

I'm not questioning that particular

I suppose that they have authority maybe based on

That may be the exigent
And that

I don't have any particular probl<am with

But then, after that took place -- and if the.re was an

23

arrest, which I don rt believe there was, but that was the

24

point of the arrest , the Brigham City police.

25

search incident to an arrest that would have had to be it.

If there was a

and then the sheriff!s department gets involved

1

The search —

2

and the ambulance crew takes him to Logan and delivers him to

3

the mental health unit.

4

Now, what I would say there is the mental health unit has

5

an obligation to do the search if there's one to be done at

6

that point.

7

have a procedure for doing it.

8

this court that there's any procedures for the ambulance crew

9

or anyone else to do that.

How they handle it they probably know.

They may

There's no evidence before

That leaves it wide open.

Even

10

in the case of an inventory of an automobile, it has to be

11

done pursuant to procedures, a written procedure, according

12

to the Utah Supreme Court.

13

obligation to do it.

14

weapons, why not search at the beginning of the transport

15

rather than the end of the transport?

16

with that.

17

But they probably have the

If we were really concerned about

That's the trouble

In this particular instance the Brigham City police did

18

do a search, probably for weapons, and didn't find anything.

19

And then after he was delivered to the mental health unit and

20

was not really in the custody of the police anymore, for

21

transport or otherwise, then they do the search.

22

they do the search at that point they were looking for

23

weapons, but you know what?

24

made there.

25

wallet out of his pocket and to take the knife sheath.

And even if

There were really two searches

There was the search by Lynn Yeates to take his
There

was no indication in either instance that either one of those
2

things were weapons, none at all.
And then he gives it to the sheriff's deputy who was

3
4

along to, I suppose, assist if Mr. Collins became violent,

5

which he was heavily sedated.

6

too.

7

that found the contraband.

8
9

That's part of the evidence

And then she searched the two items and she's the one

So, you know, it's really a step away from the whole
process, really.

It seems to me it's exactly what the

10

unreasonable search and seizure thing was intended to

11

prevent.

12

civil commitment he was in the custody of the mental health

13

unit in Logan at the time because that's where he'd been

14

delivered to.

15

a search for contraband.

16

because they didn't try to —

17

items had any indices of weapons.

18

Mr. Collins was in the custody of the —

on the

It wasn't a search for weapons at all, it was
That's obviously what it was
because neither one of those
It just wasn't there.

Of course, it seems to me the only thing the state argues

19

in their memoranda is that there was a search incident to an

20

arrest.

21

clearly the statute that allows transport makes it not an

22

arrest.

23

I don't believe it was an arrest.

I believe that

It's a civil commitment.

If it was an arrest the Brigham City police department

24

was the ones that made the arrest.

The search incident to

25

the arrest would have been required to be done fairly close.

1

In fact, there's a Supreme Court case that -- a U.S. Supreme

2 I Court case that basically says it has to be contemporaneous
3

with the arrest, which clearly it wasn't here.

And the

4

arresting agency was the Brigham City police department, not

5

Deputy Baty, who made the search later.

6

who made the search later.

And Deputy Yeates

7

And even if it was incident to an arrest, the arrest was

8

an illegal arrest because the statute requires that there be

9

a warrant unless those specific conditions are met.

So it

10

just seems to me it's obviously not justified by incident to

11

an arrest.

12

If in fact it's not justified incident to an arrest, we

13

need to identify, if we're going to allow it in, a specific

14

exception, one of those well delineated exceptions.

15

challenge anybody to show me any case law that shows me any

16 J of those well delineated exceptions here.
17
18

I

It just doesn't

fit any of them that I know.
Now, I apologize to say I challenge.
If you do, fine.

Maybe you'll think

19

of one right quickly.

I would really like

20

to have a chance to respond to it, but I don't see any.

21

Thank you.

22

THE COURT:

Mr. Baron.

23

MR. BARON:

Just briefly, Your Honor.

I think

24

mainly what we're arguing about is semantics.

You look at

25

counsel's exhibit A and it says that a peace officer --

1

authorizes a peace officer to ta ke a proposed patient into

2

custody.

3

his exhibit A, custody.

4

Specifically under the instructions that's part of

Now, Mr. Molgard says that's not an arrest, but it really

5

is the functional equivalent of an arrest.

6

really need to quibble about whe ther it's technically an

7

arrest or custody or if custody is an arrest whether it's for

8

a crime or not a crime.

9

I don't think we

Really, the concerns are exactly the same.

When you

10

arrest someone what are your concerns?

11

weapon and, secondly, that they imay have something valuable

12

on their person that they're going to claim the officer

13

stole.

14

you do a booking process where a more thorough"search is

15

performed.

16

money, so on.

17

That they may have a

Normally you arrest them , take them to the jail, then

You look in their wa llet, check the amount of

We have the exact functional equivalent here.

The person

He was actually handcuffed

18

was taken into, quote, custody.

19

and transported.

20

would assert that really it is a common law arrest, is what

21

happened at that point, although not for a crime, more of a

22

civil arrest.

23

The functional equivalent to an arrest.

And then instead of taking h im to the sheriff they took

24 I

him to the hospital.

25

equivalent.

But once a gain it's the functional

You're taking the p<arson to somewhere where

I

1

they're going to be housed, where they're going to be

2

staying.

3

hurts themselves with, hurt someone else with, plus see if

4

they've got any great amounts of money, so on.

5

booking process.

6

You need to make sure there's nothing they can

Just like the

It's the same thing.

What the constitution forbids is unreasonable searches

7

and seizures.

8

circumstances it's the same thing functionally as an arrest

9

and booking.

I would submit, Your Honor, that under these

It's not unreasonable.

It is reasonable.

And

10

really it was an arrest in every sense of 'the word, other

11

than there was no beginning crime.

12

have a statutory commitment under which the defendant was

13

arrested and transported to the facility under the statute.

14

So I think it was a reasonable search and should not be

15

suppressed.

16

THE COURT:

Counsel, I'm going to take this under

17

advisement.

18

I'd like to do some research.

19

research.

20

Instead of a crime we

I'd to --- I'm taking too much credit when I say
I never get time to do any

I have someone who will help me do some research.

The fact scenario doesn't seem to be that unusual.

When

21

I say that, I mean this can't be the first time in the United

22

States that this type of an occurrence happened.

23

taken into custody on civil commitments quite frequently.

24

Surely there's been other cases where in the process of

25

taking that person into custody and delivering them to a

People are

1

mental health facility either weapons or contraband or

2

something was discovered.

3

Nothing is coming to mind, I'm not aware of a case, but I

4

think Ifd like to have some research done and find out which

5

way that has gone possibly in other jurisdictions.

6

try and get you a written decision in about two weeks.

7
8
9

So Ifll

Anything else?
MR. MOLGARD:

Well, Your Honor, Ifve looked and I

didn't see anything in regard to that.

I might indicate that

10

I don't agree with Mr. Baron's analysis of the functional

11

equivalent thing.

12

jail it isn't the arresting officer who does the search

13

there, it's the booking officer.

14

arrest, that's some other —

15

this particular instance, if that's the case, you deliver it

16

to the mental health unit and then the mental health unit

17

does the search, I suppose, if you're talking about that.

18

Certainly it's not incident to an arrest.

19

I think that if you deliver somebody to a

THE COURT:
in a couple of weeks.

21

that's on point.
MR. BARON:

23

MR. MOLGARD:

24
25

that's another exception.

Hopefully we can find some authority

Thank you, Your Honor.
Do you want to wait to set that other

ohe Uhtil We $et thfe dgdisioh 6tt this bfte?
MR. BARON:

In

I'll try and have a decision out to you

20

22

That's not incident to an

That's fine with me.

1

THE COURT:

2

require evidence, wasn't it?

3
4
5

Let's see.

MR. MOLGARD:

Yeah.

The other one was going to

And I want to get the

transcript of the preliminary hearing if we're going to
THE COURT:

Maybe we ought to set that.

6

won't dispose of that either way?

7

here, that one will need a hearing.

8

ahead and schedule it.

9

do you expect?

10
11

MR. BARON:

4

How much time

Your Honor,
(Pause in the proceedings
THE COURT:
April 25th?

Counsel, how about the afternoon of

We can take the first hour there, 1:30 to 2:30.

MR. BARON:

6

MR. MOLGARD:

7

THE COURT:

9 I

Maybe we ought to go

I'm guessing we better plan on an hour,

5

8

This one

Regardless of what I do

30 minutes, an hour?

2
3

That will be fine, Your Honor,
That will work,

Okay.

Let's plan on that.

I'll have a

decision out on this one before that date
MR. MOLGARD:

Thank you, Your Honor,

0
1 |
2

—

(Concluded at 3:15 p.m.
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